Abstract

Security loopholes have been shown for discrete-variable Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting a continuous-variable QKD system. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.

© 2014 Optical Society of America

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